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ABSTRACT
Economists typically view the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) as a classic cartel. Yet many journalists and much
of the public reject this unidimensional view of the NCAA as an
organization. In fact, the NCAA's wide authority over all aspects of
the athletic side of major colleges and universities has not been
limited to issues that are solely related to maximizing revenues for its
members. A more appropriate model for understanding NCAA decisions is
the theory of clubs. Sporting competitions, the main outputs of the
athletic programs involved in the NCAA, are public goods shared by the
competitors. Thus it seems appropriate to analyze NCAA decisions within
a model that stresses this aspect of the decision making problem. In
this paper we use data on NCAA convention roll-call votes between 1985
and 1992 to investigate the intraorganizational decision making process.
While we can explain variation in decisions of schools on restructuring
issues quite well, we have been only moderately successful for other
issues. It thus seems unlikely that decisions on academic reform are
motivated solely by cartel considerations.

nEconomists typically view the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) as a classic cartel.^ Barro (1991) reports that a
panel of economists at Harvard even selected the NCAA as winner of the
first annual prize for "best monopoly in America." Yet many journalists
and much of the public reject this unidimensional view of the NCAA as an
organization. This is consistent with Cave and Salant's (1987) argument
that agricultural marketing boards who vote on volume restrictions only
rarely act "as if" to maximize industry profits. ^ The NCAA's wide
authority over all aspects of the athletic side of major colleges and
universities has not been limited to issues that are solely related to
maximizing revenues for its members. For example, much recent debate
has focused on rules about academic qualifications for student athletes.
If the behavior of the NCAA cannot be fully captured by cartel models,
how can it be explained?
All sporting events require the participants to follow similar
rules. These rules can be as loosely drawn as the definition of the
manhole cover as first base in a sticlcball game or as complicated as the
two-inch thick NCAA manual. The competitions are public goods shared by
the competitors. Organization of the competitions is essentially the
same problem as posed by Buchanan (1965) in his theory of clubs.
^ See, for example, the works by McCormick and Meiners (1987), Fleisher,
et al . , Lawrence (1987) and Becker (1985), among others. The courts
have also found that the NCAA operates as a cartel. Indeed, the Supreme
Court made frequent use of the word "cartel" in referring to the NCAA in
a 1984 case involving television restrictions, NCAA v. University of
Oklahoma (McCormick and Meiners, 1987).
^ Further evidence along this line is provided in Saland and Goodstein
(1990) .
However, the dilemma for sporting clubs is different from the congestion
problem emphasized by Buchanan. The value of the competition to
individual members is related to the abilities of other members.
Members would prefer to compete against the best competition that they
can. This may come about due to financial returns (playing in the PGA
tour as opposed to a satellite tour) or simply striving to be the best.
They would also prefer to compete with members with similar abilities.
The quality of competition is therefore a function of the absolute
ability of members, the variance of this ability and the number of
members
.
At first, everyone is welcome because critical numbers are
required for competitions. Members might be quite diverse in their
abilities and other interests. As the club grows, there is a strong
tendency to conduct competitions among homogeneous groups. Thus, tennis
associations have various ratings for players. Players who do not meet
minimum requirements are not allowed to enter certain competitions.
Clubs must therefore formulate rules that will serve to select only
potential members that meet certain criteria. This is analogous to the
literature on discriminatory clubs (DeSerpa, 1977). Members consume a
club package (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980) that includes both returns
from cartel activity and consumption returns based on the quality of
competition.
^
While the ability to control costs and control output to increase
revenues may be a direct result of the formation of the club, it is not
^ In an interesting discussion of research in the area of legal cartels.
Porter (1991) suggests similar reasons for cartel stability.
a requirement. On the other hand, the stability of the NCAA cartel can
almost certainly be attributed to the value of the shared public good of
NCAA competitions. Thus it seems appropriate to analyze NCAA decisions
within a model that stresses this aspect of the decision making problem.
In this paper we use data on NCAA convention roll-call votes
between 1985 and 1992 to investigate the intraorganizational decision
making process. The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we provide
a brief history of the NCAA and recent changes in the environment that
have led to changes in its rules. Second, we present a simple model of
decision making in a sports club that we believe captures the problems
of the individual schools belonging to the NCAA. We then describe our
data and give the results of our empirical work. We close with some
conclusions based on these results.
I . Background
The NCAA originated as a group of eastern schools interested in
ending the growing violence in collegiate football.'* While many schools
had tried to impose restrictions on the rules of the sport, it was not
possible for individual schools, via unilateral action, to be successful
in solving the problem. They needed a body to govern interregion or
interconference play. By forming the NCAA, the schools could
internalize the problem and successfully initiate an agreeable set of
rule changes. By voluntarily joining the NCAA, schools agreed to follow
^ Lawrence (1987) provides a thorough treatment of the history of the
NCAA.
the policies of this third party and to be policed similarly (Barry and
Wong, 1986)
.
The successful internalization of the industry-wide problem of
violence was followed by rapid increases in membership and in the scope
of the NCAA's regulatory jurisdiction. While the original intention of
the organizing schools was not to create the typical collusive
arrangement we call a cartel, the growth of the NCAA made such an
adjustment natural. Significant restrictions on recruiting were put in
place after W.W.II with the passage of the "Sanity Rules" to "preserve
amateurism" in intercollegiate sports. The NCAA also exercised complete
control of college football telecasts that were enjoying immense growth
during the fifties and 60s.
By the 1970 's, substantial television revenues from football and
basketball were being generated by a subset of the original membership.
NCAA members voted in total on the rules and regulations they would
impose upon each other. Thus, the small programs could "exploit" the
larger programs by imposing organizational rules that were not in the
5best interest of the revenue producing schools . The gains from
complementarities in rule making for many schools were no longer
sufficient to balance the diversity penalty.^ The threat of exit by the
larger programs provided sufficient incentive to support the division of
5
This is identical to the exploitation suggested in club theory where
the poorer firms (or individuals) free ride on the richer members. See
Olson(1965)
^ This segmentation has aspects of both cartel and club theory. While
club theory would say that the upper level programs would find it
optimal to separate and associate only amongst themselves, it is also
true that the smaller programs have a strong interest in continued
association with these high revenue generating institutions.
the NCAA into different classes. Schools with major athletic programs
would be considered Division I (235 schools in 1973).^ Division II
institutions, while also university or large college level programs,
were not of the same caliber. Finally, Division III contained the small
colleges. Eventually, Division I was further divided into schools with
big time, moderate size and small football programs (Divisions I-A, I-AA
and I-AAA)
.
By adopting this internal reorganization, the NCAA was making the
necessary move to keep reticent members in line. There are still many
votes of the NCAA that are made by the full body (now more than 800
members). However, sensitive issues particular to the allocation of
rents in Division I are now voted upon by only those members in this
group. Thus, those schools that contribute more to the revenue
generation side have a stronger vote in the policies that governed these
particular activities .
While the significant startup costs associated with football
served as a barrier to entry for most schools, increasing revenues in
men's basketball during the 1980 's lured many schools to want entry into
Division I. The television revenues from the 1992 national tournament
exceeded $75 million. At the 1992 convention, existing members finally
reacted to this entry with a series of votes to "restructure" Division
I. These made entry for fringe programs more difficult. Of course,
these rules also had the effect of significantly increasing the costs
for many existing members.
^ The number of schools with Division I football programs was 124
(Lawrence, 1987)
.
Three issues dominated the Division I NCAA, calendar during the
1980 's and early 1990's: academic reform, cost reduction and
restructuring. Academic reform was perhaps the most controversial.
Schools came under sharp criticism for the graduation rates in men's
football and basketball.
There are several methods by which individual schools can attempt
to solve this problem. First, schools can spend money for extra
academic help for athletes. Second, they can increase their
requirements for admission and thus improve the probability that the
athletes will graduate. Grade and course requirements for athletes to
be eligible to compete can be increased. Finally, schools can force
coaches to decrease the time requirements for athletes. Many individual
schools and some conferences did attempt these reforms. As with the
violence in football that started the NCAA, however, individual reforms
place the reforming institutions at a competitive disadvantage.
While the structure of the NCAA is designed to allow athletic
competitions between homogeneous athletic departments, the schools are
extremely heterogeneous with respect to academics. Thus, any rule on
the initial eligibility of athletes would have a different impact across
Division I members. Changes in admission policy occurred in three
areas: required "core" courses in high school, required high school
grade point average and test score achievement. All were increased. If
the athlete met the overall grade point and core course requirements but
did not meet the test minimum or the core course requirement, then he or
she was labeled a "partial qualifier." The NCAA labeled an athlete who
failed to meet the overall grade point requirement as a "nonqualifier .
"
The major controversies arose when the NCAA, voted to make
nonqualifiers and partial qualifiers ineligible to compete in their
freshmen year They removed first year aid from nonqualifiers
(Proposition 48) and later extended the ban on first year aid to partial
qualifiers (Proposition 42). These reforms improved the probability
that athletes would succeed academically. They also reduced the cost of
these athletes by denying financial aid. However, the major impact of
the increased SAT/ACT test requirements fell on minority athletes. The
SAT/ACT minimums were higher than the average test scores at many
traditionally blaclc universities. The increased requirements obviously
gave a recruiting advantage to those schools who had traditionally
recruited few athletes with disadvantaged baclcgrounds
.
Other academic reforms did not have the same racial overtones.
However, they were often opposed by coaches because the reforms either
increased costs of the programs or threatened the quality of their
athletic teams (by reducing practice time or the number of
competitions )
.
Both academic reform and restructuring could often mean increases
in the costs of running athletic departments and thus be in direct
opposition to cost cutting measures. Thus, we might observe schools
voting against reform due to the cost implications. Cost cutting
measures also usually have impacts on the relative advantage some
schools have over others. Limits on the number of scholarships, for
example, would typically favor small programs.
Many of these reforms might be viewed entirely differently by
different segments of the university community. The university
presidents might be strongly in favor of academic reform and cost
cutting, while the athletic directors would be more concerned with the
quality and size of their programs. This creates the possibility of a
principal-agent problem when a representative of the athletic
departments does the voting.
Each school (and each conference) that is an NCAA member has a
representative to the NCAA who has one vote at the convention. The
representative serves at the pleasure of the chief executive officer.
While the presidents of universities could attend the convention and
cast the institutional vote, historically they often allowed the
athletic directors (ADs) or coaches to be their representatives.
In 1985 the university presidents forced the NCAA to categorize
certain policy issues as subject to roll-call vote. This allowed the
presidents to insure that their voting representatives voted according
to the president's wishes.^
The significance of this addition of the roll-call vote should not
be under emphasized. Now the internal votes of each of the
cooperatively organized members were on record for outside viewers.
This was attractive to many groups. First, it allowed the university
presidents to directly monitor their representatives at the voting
convention. Second, it allowed those with particular interest in
g
Starting in 1989, the representative could not be a coach.
^ The Board of Presidents forwarded a proposal to the 1984 NCAA
convention. The plan called for control of the NCAA to be put in the
hands of the CEOs of member universities. Later, Harvard president
Derek Bok reported "We did a lot of telephoning before the '84
convention. We had the votes. Even the Chronicle of Higher Education
said so." Of course, the athletic directors did not vote to pass away
their power, prompting Bok to comment: "When it came time to vote, many
athletic directors went against the instructions of their presidents who
did not attend the convention." (Dealy, 1990).
university affairs, such as legislators, to hold constituent schools
responsible for their action.
Not all votes were subject to roll-call status: only those
specifically designated by the Presidents* Council. We do not attempt
to explain which votes made the roll-call list. Rather, our focus is on
the actual voting pattern that resulted. There are several
controversial policy moves for which we have data on votes; some of
these issues return to the ballot in subsequent years.
These issues can be conveniently bundled into three different
classes. The first we shall call cost cutting-. These plans are
straightforward moves to reduce costs of member institutions. Some of
these higher costs are caused by standard prisoners' dilemma responses
to non-price competition. Others are just work rules to minimize any
featherbedding that may occur as a natural byproduct of not-for-profit
entities
.
The second group deals strictly with academic refojjn. This
category includes policies that concern changes in the minimum
acceptable admission standards and scholarship eligibility; eligibility
of athletes once they have been admitted to the institution; and
restraints on time commitments and number of contests. Votes in favor
of these measures can be motivated by academic considerations. However,
they can also provide competitive advantages to some schools and often
have cost implications.
The final group includes votes designed to increase the minimum
requirements for membership in Division I. These are the reatjnictnirxng
votes that can be explained by both club and cartel considerations.
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II. A Simple Model of the NCAA as a Club
We wish to build a model of N schools that form a club. As in all
clubs, the purpose for forming the organization is to exploit some good
or service that has a public good characteristic. In the present
context, this public good is the provision of competitors or a framework
within which to organize games. The result is an athletic program that
gets returns from teams. We use the variable R to represent total
returns to the club.^^
Each member of the club must choose the level of commitment to
athletic and nonathletic activity. Let 0^ denote the athletic
commitment by school i. While this variable is multidimensional in
reality, we will adopt the simplifying assumption that it represents the
quality of the particular school's athletic program. Individual school
returns, r^, are determined by some sharing function, S-, which
indicates how much of total club returns will go to each school. This
share is a direct function of the level of quality of the school, 0^,
compared to the quality of the rest of the club members:
where is the average quality of all members of the club.
The specification of the club's returns, R, is very important for
our problem. We write the returns function as:
R(0, (T, N)
,
^^ This variable is not to be interpreted as purely revenue. Some
sports return value to a school, even though they make little or no
money.
11
i
where a represents the variance of club quality. We make the following
assumptions
:
Al) An individual school's share function is increasing in own
dS d^S
school quality, at a decreasing rate:
-r:r > and ^ ^ ^ <,39, 36,
A2) Each school's share is decreasing in the average quality of
dS 3^5
the club: < and —— ^ 0-
3 3 0^
A3) R is increasing in the average quality of the club, but with
3R 3^R
diminishing impact: > and —~ < 0.
3r 3^R
A4 ) R is decreasing in the variance: -r— < and _ -> ^ 0.3a 3cr
A5) R is increasing in the number of members, N, but diminishing
returns sets in after some threshold level of N, defined as
3R 3^-R 3-R
Ni-. That is, -z— > 0, ^—r > for N < Nf. and . .
.
^ 3N 3N^ ^ 3N^ >
for N > N^ . Figure 1 gives a plausible shape for this
return function.
Figure 1
The first two assumptions concern the allocation of club returns
among the member schools. Each school can expect to get increasing
returns from its own quality. However, any school's share will fall if
the general quality level of its competition improves, ceteris paribus.
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Assumption three captures the fact that the output of the club is more
attractive to purchasers if the games are played at a higher level of
talent. Assumption four says that the returns to athletic clubs are
enhanced by more competitive games among the members. The greater the
variance, the less comparable the teams. ^^
Assumption five is at the heart of the public good problem that
leads to the formation of the club. Admitting more members could
increase the variance and decrease the mean (both working to lower R)
,
at small club sizes. However, incumbent members need more competitors
because the lack of numbers may not provide a full schedule of games.
As N continues to increase, the direct impact of each new school on
returns gets significantly smaller.
Finally, we add the variable x^ to represent the net consumption
of a composite private good used by school i. This nonathletic
consumption could be thought of as academic expenditures. Each school's
utility function is just a function of x and returns r: C7^(x^,rj) . We
assume that U^ is increasing and concave in each argument.
Individual School Utility Maximization
Suppose each school is differentiated by its ability to produce a
given quality level. The school can increase its Oj^ with an investment
in time and money. Suppose also that the schools are heterogeneous in
^^ An alternative way to view this is to consider that, not unlike the
traditional theory of clubs, members prefer to associate with those of
similar attributes. Thus, if one views the return function as a
multidimensional package of benefits the school receives from membership
in the club, these benefits are enhanced by a membership with less
varying characteristics.
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their ability to combine these inputs. We let A denote the school's
athletic aptitude, a variable that is exogenous to the institution. We
can then rank schools by their relative ability to produce quality
athletics: a school of type A^ will be more efficient at producing
than a school of type A2 < A^, ceteris paribus. ^^
The school's problem is to maximize U^ subject to the budget
constraint. Let p^ be the price of the composite private good and
C(0^,A^) represent the cost to a school of type A^ needed to produce an
athletic program of quality level 0^. Costs are increasing in 0^ and
(?C dc
decreasing in aptitude: -rr- > and —— < 0. The school's budget
constraint can then be written as p^x + C[0^,A^) < I and the
maximization problem as:
(1) Max {U.('x^,rj|l = p^.x + cre^,Aj;
Each school acts as a Cournot-Nash competitor, choosing 0^ and x^ to
maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint and taking R, N and A^ as
constants. In addition, each school holds 0^, the athletic quality of
any of its rival institutions, as constant. Since the school is small
relative to the club, the belief that rival schools have fixed 0. means
that each school views the average quality of the club, 0, as unchanged
by its own 0^ decision.
^^ Even though the cartel does a good job of limiting the actual
pecuniary compensation of potential student-athletes, all schools engage
in non-price competition. Some schools, by the nature of their
location, history, alumni, etc., are more effective at attracting the
better talent, ceteris paribus.
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To consider the properties of the equilibrium, look at the first
order conditions for maximization of (1) . These conditions are written
as the following set of equations:
(4) I = p^x + ae^.A^)
.
These are the standard first order conditions, with X denoting the
Lagrange multiplier. Substituting (2) into (3) gives the result:
(5)
dU dr-
dr, ae. dC(e.,AJ /dO,
dx
The level of athletic quality and the amount of the private good should
be chosen to equate the ratio of marginal utilities, the right hand
side, to the ratio of costs (prices) on the left hand side.
Group Equilibrium
Without explicit entry barriers, the size of the club will be
determined by a zero return condition. Any member of a lesser division
within the NCAA can opt to enter Division I any time. While this will
increase its expected returns from athletics, it will also increase its
costs
.
Given the heterogeneity across programs, we order the schools such
that A^ > A2 > A^ > ... >A^ > . . .> Aj. where T represents the universe of
possible members. Thus, we can think of entry as the ordered
progression of schools according to the position in this ranking. As
each school enters, its own 0^ will be less than the most recent
entrant, reflecting the fact that its particular ability to produce a
15
sports program is less than its immediate predecessor. If Nq is the
zero return equilibrium number of members, this just means that school
Nq + 1 in the ranking of A finds it more attractive to stay out of the
club. Equilibrium will involve Nq schools with the inframarginal
schools, i < Nq, earning positive rents from the activity.
This ranking of schools by ability has some clear implications for
R
average returns, —
,
given the assumptions above. Adding a marginal
school has three direct impacts on R. It will decrease the club's
average quality and increase the dispersion of talent, both negative
effects. But it will help in the public good aspect, by increasing the
membership available to compete in games. As N increases, the positive
impact on R via. the latter effect will diminish and eventually be offset
by the mean and variance effects. Since schools enter in (decreasing)
order of athletic ability, the marginal school will eventually cause R
to decrease on net. This guarantees that there exists some membership
size that maximizes average returns to members of the club, a common
assumption in club theory. It also implies that the optimal membership
size is lower than the level of N decided by the zero return
condition. ^^ In the absence of government rules to the contrary, we can
expect the club to attempt to pass rules that place limits on
competition between members and to attempt to limit membership.
^"^ It is certainly possible to construct explicit form examples where
this does not hold. Starrett (1988) has an excellent review of the
issues of economies of scale in clubs, vis a vis membership size.
However, we adopt this more rigid specification. It is widely used in
club theory and, perhaps more importantly, accurately captures the
membership size problem faced by Division I schools in the NCAA.
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Cl\ab Intervention
In the equilibrium just described, each school chooses its as a
Cournot-Nash agent. As in many cases of Cournot-Nash behavior, this
outcome can be improved upon by cooperation among club members. In our
case, the rules imposed upon the club members are decided by majority
vote in annual meetings of the NCAA members. This suggests use of the
median voter model to explain the changes imposed upon the membership
during these cooperative meetings.
Consider the utility function of the median voter: t7„(x„, r)
- R
where r^ = S (6^, 0)-^. Let V^ denote the net value to the median voter
in the club.^^ This can be written as:
Substituting for r„ this becomes
- R
School m will select its own 6^ and x^ to maximize (6) with club-wide
variables, R, N, and 0, taken as exogenous. The club decisions, then,
should be aimed at manipulating these variables to improve members
'
welfare.
The task of the club as a whole is to adopt rule changes that
enhance the utility of its members. While there are clearly many
candidates from the universe of possible rules, we focus on a special
class of restrictions. These rules concern the actual quality levels,
0, of the individual member schools. Such rules are especially
^^ We assume that the total membership size is an odd number to make the
median voter well identified.
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attractive in that they are both easily observable and easily enforced.
They also allow indirect control of entry. In particular, we focus on
two forms of quality constraints.
Minimum Quality Rules
The first and most obvious is for the club to adopt minimum quality
standards. For example, the club could simply pass a requirement that,
to be a member in good standing, all schools must meet some minimum
quality level 0„j^^- To be accepted, this restriction must not adversely
affect the median voter. ^^ The schools affected by this regulation
would be the marginal schools.
To illustrate, consider the effect of a minor adjustment in ^^^„,
above the currently observed bottom of the quality distribution. For
purposes of discussion, suppose this constraint is binding on just one
school (denoted as school n) forcing it to increase its 6?^. Consider
first the impact on the median voter's net utility. To begin with,
adopt the assumption that the forced increase in 0^ will not result in
exit of school n.^^ Differentiating (6) with respect to 6^ we have:
dV^
_
R
^
dS dO^ ^ S_ SO ^ dO_ dR da ^ c>C[) d0^
dO^ N de^ dO^ dO dO^ N de dO^ da dO^ dO^ dO^
This can be rewritten as:
^^ The rule could increase costs for the median voter while still
increasing net returns.
^® While the zero profit equilibrium we have imposed may appear in
conflict with this assumption, that is not necessarily the case. First,
all the zero profit equilibrium guarantees is that the next potential
entrant would earn negative returns; the last actual entrant may be
earning positive net returns. Second, the increase in 0^ could have
sufficient impact on R to forestall exit.
18
d^^ TV ^^ ^^ dfii^ N de do^ N ae ae^ da do^
To evaluate this derivative, note first that individual school
maximization will assure that the first term in brackets goes to zero.
The remaining terms are rewritten as:
R dS dO S[) dR d'e SO dR da
N ae dd^ N de dO^ N da dd^
The first term is certainly negative; increasing the average quality of
the club is detrimental to the share of returns that the median voter
can obtain. However, the second and third terms are positive. Forcing
the marginal school to increase quality will increase the average
quality of competition and reduce the heterogeneity in the club. Both
are beneficial to the median voter.
If the marginal school exits, average quality will increase and
heterogeneity will decrease, producing effects as in (8) . In addition,
the share of the median school will be influenced by the reduction in
competitors. The returns to the median voter of forcing the marginal
school out of the club will therefore also be influenced by this per-
R
school-return (r:) effect.
Figure 2 shows net returns of the median voter as a function of
the chosen quality of the marginal school, n. Actual quality choice by
the marginal school, 0^, is depicted along the horizontal axis. The
function V^ represents net returns to the median voter under the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome given that quality choice by the
marginal firm, n. Here, the median school would choose to impose the
minimum quality constraint at level 0^:^^. This maximizes the net
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returns to the median school in the resulting Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the club members.
Net
Returns
Figure 2
The other curve, V^.^, shows the net returns for the marginal school
as a function of 0^. 0^ is the quality level that school n would choose
under the unconstrained equilibrium. V^.^ crosses the axis at 6^. If the
club tries to impose a minimum quality level that is greater than 0^,
the marginal school will exit. Thus, the number of schools will fall
and the value function makes a discontinuous jump at this point. The
club externality factor probably means that this jump is negative at
small club sizes and positive as club size increases. However, even if
the jump is positive, the global maximum for the median school may still
rest with a minimum quality constraint that allows the marginal school
to stay in the club.
Increases in minimum quality serve to improve the homogeneity of
members and the quality of competition while serving to act as a barrier
20
to entry. However, beyond some point,
^min' these lead to a reduction
in net returns due to increases in costs and increased share of marginal
competitors. This is essentially the conflict of cost cutting and
xcstmctvLrxiig faced by the NCAA.
Maxinmm Quality Rules
The other form of restriction we consider is a cap on the maximum
quality level of the athletic program at any member school. Since such
a rule only impacts the schools with the highest aptitude, no one will
exit. All of the effect on the median voter's net returns, V^, will be
through the G and a effects.
As before, suppose the club adopts a rule to limit at 9^^^,
which is chosen so only the school with the highest is affected. By
our convention on the ordering of A, this is school numbered I. Exit is
not an alternative, as returns for the most efficient competitor are
still positive. However, the school is constrained to lower 0^^ to 0^^^.
Using the same V^ as in (7), we again consider the effect on V^ from a
change in 0j. Rewrite equation (8) for reference:
R ^ d0 SO ^R d0 SO dR da
(9) — (^^-T-) + — (-r^—r-) + —^(-^N (^ d0^ N c>0 d0^ N da d0^
This time, the signs of the first two terms are reversed. By lowering
0^, the average quality of the club diminishes, so the first term is
positive and the second is negative. The third term is again positive;
by reducing the highest school's quality, the club has become more
homogeneous. As before, we are unable to sign (9) given the general
nature of our functional forms. However, the general shape of the V^
function with respect to 0^ is similar to that shown in Figure 2. Since
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school 1 is the school with the highest quality, it is quite possible
that the V^ function is decreasing in 0^ at the nonintervention
equilibrium. If this is the case, we would expect the median voter to
move to restrict the school (or schools) at the upper end of the quality
spectrvim.
In Figure 3, V^ depicts the net returns to the most efficient
school (the first in the ordering on A) . As before, this shows the net
returns to school 1 for different quality choices, given that the other
schools in the club will choose the Cournot-Nash levels of quality. 0^
is the quality choice of school I if unconstrained. The median school
will realize net returns of V^ by acting Cournot in response to the
different observed qualities of school 1. Clearly, this school can
benefit by restricting the high quality school to a maximum quality
level of max
Imposition of maximum quality constraints can make entry more
attractive for marginal schools. Figure 3 also depicts the returns to
the potential entrant from a new, (n+1) -school equilibrium. Again, n
schools would act Cournot while 1 school is constrained.
'n+l
Figure 3
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In the case depicted by Figure 3, choice of 0^^^ as the constraint
would not induce entry by school (n+1) . However, under a different set
of parameters,
^^ax '^Q^l'^ li^ to the left of 0^^^ , inducing entry.
Then, the club might consider the combination of minimum and maximum
rules. Thus, cost cutting' legislation can induce entry by unwanted
members and result in the subsequent passage of rastxract-nving'
legislation.
This simple model of median voting in a club situation illustrates
the general proposition that it can be in the interests of the median
voter to simultaneously vote to increase costs by imposing minimum
criteria on some members and to decrease costs by restricting behavior
of the membership. Support for these club rules varies in our model
depending on the school type (A) .^^
Explaining the votes of club members obviously depends on finding
proxies for A. In addition, returns to schools may not be
unidimensional, making the median school on one issue different from the
median school on another. We now turn to confronting these data issues
in the explanation of voting in the NCAA.
III. Data and Results
Data used in this paper fall into three general categories. The
first consists of data on roll-call votes at NCAA national conventions.
17 Note that 0^ is the quality of school 1, NOT school n+1
^^ Appendix B offers a simple example using explicit functional forms
with results that confirm our hypotheses.
23
The second consists of data about athletics at the individual schools
and the third covers other characteristics of the schools.
A list of the independent variables measuring school
characteristics is given in Table 1. There are twelve variables that
characterize athletics at the schools. Two variables (FOOTBALL and
BASKETBALL) capture the school's commitment to the revenue producing
sports. GRANTS and MINORSPS measure the total commitment of the school
to athletics. The remaining eight variables measure conference
affiliations. These variables are included to control for special
conference rules and any unmeasured characteristics of the individual
schools that are homogeneous within the conferences.
We use eight variables to account for other characteristics of the
schools. Three (TOP25, TOP26-51, OTHER) measure the general academic
quality of the institutions, while SAT is a measure of the quality of
students at the institution. BLACK is included to allow for differences
between traditionally black universities and other universities on
issues relating to the appropriate measurement of the quality of
incoming athletes. ENROLL, DOLLARS and PRIVATE are designed to measure
the school's size and financial capability to run expensive athletic
programs. PRIVATE is also an inverse measure of the externalities that
may be important for public universities' successful pursuits of
athletic success. ^^
*^ Much of the revenue generated by sporting events is captured by local
businesses rather than the universities. In addition, citizens of the
state often talce pride in the athletic and academic achievements of the
state university. State legislators.' interests in the fortunes of the
athletic department therefore then to be out of proportion to the
department's contribution to the state university.
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Voting Data
Beginning in 1985, the Presidents' council designated certain
votes to require roll-call voting. We gathered data from thirty roll-
call votes during this period. Our analysis was restricted to final
votes on propositions that applied to all Division I schools in which at
least 20 percent of the voters were on the losing side of the vote.^®
One approach to the analysis of these data would be to estimate
the determinants of each of these votes separately. However, many
issues are multidimensional. Majority voting can then lead to apparent
inconsistencies in voting behavior (Mueller, 1989). For example, four
of the votes in our data set concern the use of Pell Grants. Pell
Grants are available from the government to help finance education for
low income individuals. NCAA members had to decide how to treat these
Grants when the athletes also received institutional financial aid. One
vote limited the combination of all forms of financial aid to a maximum
of $1400 above the value of tuition, fees, room and board and required
course-related books. Another set the limit at $1700. Still another
required the limit to not exceed the normal cost of attendance in a
comparable program at the institution. Without information on the
alternatives, it is difficult to decide if a vote against these measures
is a vote in favor of cutting cost or against cutting costs ! When these
problems are multidimensional, a cycling problem can occur in which
^^ This excludes, for example, votes on specific sports such as football
that include only a minority of the schools. It also excludes votes on
amendments, votes to reconsider a previous vote and previous votes if
the proposition was reconsidered during the same convention.
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voters move to extreme positions . 21 Therefore, understanding of the
underlying determinants of voting patterns may require some combination
of the votes on specific issues.
Previous analyses of congressional voting patterns have differed
on the role of diversity of issues in the explanation of votes by
members of the U.S. Congress. Poole and Rosenthal (1991), for example,
argue that congressional votes can be predicted quite accurately by
knowing the party and ideology of the voter whatever the issue . On the
other hand, Clausen (1973) breaks issues into five distinct groups while
Peltzman (1984) uses thirteen groups. We categorized our thirty
different votes into seven groups. The first group contained four votes
on the use of SAT scores to decide the initial eligibility of student
athletes for athletics, institutional aid and paid visits. Four votes
on the use of Pell Grants for financial aid for athletes were included
in the second group. The third group contained six votes on rules about
eligibility once the athlete was a student at the institution. Group
four included seven votes on the status of partial qualifiers. This
group includes the famous "Proposition 42" that removed financial aid
for partial qualifiers for their first year at the institution. The
fifth group contained three votes on the use of aid for athletes during
the summer. Three votes in group six were aimed at reducing the time
commitment of athletes in basketball and football. Finally, the seventh
group of three votes concerned increased requirements (so called
"restructuring") for membership in Division I of the NCAA.
2^ For example, the same voter might vote against a small amount of aid
and thus eliminate aid entirely and then vote in favor of a large amount
of aid. For more on this possibility, see Mueller, (1989) pp. 31-57.
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Once we had established the seven groups of votes, we used factor
analysis to find if the issues were sufficiently homogeneous that a
single index score (the factor score) could be used to analyze votes in
the group. This was true for four of the seven groups. Two distinct
factors were identified for the SAT and eligibility groups and three
factors were found for the partial qualifier votes.
These eleven factor scores form the basis for our analysis of the
roll-call voting at NCAA conventions. Table 2 enumerates the individual
votes and the factor score group in which they had a high factor weight.
Except the vote on Prop. 42, all votes had positive weights for the
indicated factor. We therefore interpret high factor scores as support
for the propositions. The large negative weight for Prop. 42 is
consistent with the tone of the other three votes under the first
partial qualifier factor score. The other three votes all attempted to
reduce the strength of Prop. 42.
Results
Regression results are presented in Table 3. Besides the results
for individual coefficients, four F-tests provide tests of groups of
coefficients: F-Conferences (all conference dummy variables), F-Quality
Rating (TOP 25, TOP26-51, OTHER, SAT), F-Sports (FOOTBALL, BASKETBALL,
MINORSPS, GRANTS) and F-Characteristics (BLACK, DOLLARS, ENROLL,
PRIVATE)
.
The Restructuring vote score is the purest test of the impact of
differing cost and revenue conditions on votes within the NCAA "club."
These votes increased the minimum cost of belonging to Division I by
requiring more sports, higher scholarship aid and more matches with
Division I opponents (increasing travel costs). Those in favor of
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restructuring claimed that passage would provide a more homogeneous
membership and an even playing field. Those opposed cited cost
considerations. The practical implication of passage was to make it
more difficult for institutions with small programs to join Division I
to share in the revenues from the men's basketball tournament. Of
course, this benefit for existing members comes at a substantial cost
for those programs that did not already meet these increased minimums
.
Traditionally black universities (BLACK) and private universities
(PRIVATE) typically have small programs and they voted against
restructuring. Large schools (ENROLL) with large endowments (DOLLARS)
and large programs (GFIANTS) voted in favor. As expected, those schools
that had traditionally done well in the men's basketball tournament
(BASKETBALL) voted in favor. However, holding constant basketball
success, schools in the top three basketball conferences (BIGEIAST, ACC,
BIGTEN) voted against restructuring. Holding constant the size of
programs, schools that have done well in minor sports (MINORSPS) also
voted against restructuring. Much of the cost increase would occur in
the minor sports budgets
.
Passage of the Pell Grant and summer aid proposals could also
increase costs. The Pell Grant legislation provided for larger total
grants to athletes who were eligible for Pell Grants . Competition for
these athletes therefore might require increases in institutional aid.
Both traditionally black universities (BLACK) and Ivy League schools
(IVY) voted against Pell Grant proposals. Since Ivy League schools do
not award athletic scholarships, their rules for aid are the same for
all students. Many students at black universities are eligible for Pell
Grants. Availability of excess financial aid at other universities
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would put them at a competitive disadvantage with lower income black
athletes. As expected, schools that have many athletes on aid (GRANTS)
were against increases in costs associated with both summer aid and Pell
Grants. The pattern of significance of the other coefficients in these
two regressions suggests a sport specific interpretation of the votes.
Large schools with football programs were strongly in favor of the Pell
Grant proposals. The Football Coaches Association lobbied in favor of
passage. Apparently, many football players are eligible for these
grants. On the other hand, schools with stronger basketball programs
seemed to support the summer aid proposals. These proposals were
designed to provide summer help for athletes. Many schools have
specific summer programs to help disadvantaged students make the
transition to college life. These programs apparently are particularly
popular among schools with traditionally strong basketball programs.
The coefficients for BLACK , BASKETBALL, BIGEAST and ACC were all
significantly positive in the summer aid regressions. Black
universities have been much more competitive in basketball than in
football. The Big East and the ACC conferences are also known as
basketball conferences.
Negative coefficients for SAT Scores 1 and Partial Qualifier 1 and
positive coefficients for SAT Scores 2 and Partial Qualifier 2 and 3
suggest support for exam scores to decide initial eligibility of
athletes. Increases in the minimum acceptable score provide a
recruiting advantage for schools with student bodies with high average
scores. Some traditionally black universities have average SAT scores
below the minimums required under this legislation. Therefore, the
strong significant BLACK coefficients for both SAT Score regressions
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were expected. The SAT variable is also significant for SAT Scores 1
and the Partial Qualifier regressions. Votes on the Partial Qualifier
legislation can also be influenced by cost considerations and conference
rules. A vote to favor this legislation will reduce costs since
athletes who do not meet the exam score minimums are not allowed to
receive aid in their first year. This might explain why the black
universities did not vote against this legislation as strongly as they
did for SAT score legislation. The Partial Qualifier legislation shows
a strong influence of conference affiliation on voting patterns in part
because of conference rules. The Big Ten Conference requires junior
college transfers to sit out one year if they were partial qualifiers
out of high school (Partial Qualifier 2); the Pacific Ten Conference
makes heavy use of junior college transfers because of the strong junior
college system in California. Their votes are therefore not surprising.
The Southwest Conference and the Southeastern Conference have already
adopted rules that do not allow the recruitment of partial qualifiers.
Their rules are therefore now more stringent than the NCAA. Although
there is no ACC rule on partial qualifiers, all schools have decided not
to accept them.
The three Eligibility scores and the Time Limit score are made up
of votes that were also part of academic reform. Limits on time were
typically opposed by coaches, but they apparently were supported by
schools in many major conferences. Conference variables provided the
only significant coefficients for this score. These variables were also
important for the eligibility voting. This again may reflect the fact
that some conferences (the Big Ten in particular) had conference rules
on eligibility that were much stronger than NCAA rules. Traditionally
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black universities voted strongly against the 1992 eligibility reforms
(Eligibility 1) . We have no explanation for this vote since the reforms
did not involve test scores.
IV. Summary
While we can explain variation in decisions of schools on
restructuring issues quite well, we have been only moderately successful
for other issues. Differences in individual school characteristics in
their ability to absorb the increased costs associated with changes in
membership criteria yielded significant results in the expected
directions. However, measures of differences in athletic programs were
rarely significant in explaining other decisions. It thus seems
unlikely that decisions on academic reform are motivated solely by
cartel considerations as suggested by Fleisher et al (1990) . There is
also no apparent influence of school quality on these decisions.
Institutions with higher status in the academic community were no more
likely to support academic reform than those with lesser status.
The strong, significant results for SAT score and black university
status in analyses that concerned the use of standardized test results
could be interpreted as favoring the cartel motivation hypothesis. They
could also reflect systemic differences in beliefs about the value of
standardized tests in predicting performance. The later interpretation
seems more likely given the results for the influence of school quality.
Conference affiliation was significant for most decisions. This
reflects both differences in conference rules that precede NCAA,
decisions and unmeasured qualities of schools that helped form the
conferences in the first place.
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Economic models of school behavior under the NCAA are important in
understanding motivation for some decisions. There are other decisions
that may be indirectly influenced by economic considerations. But we
should be careful in attributing all NCAA changes to pure economics.
Our results simply don't support that position.
\
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Table 1 : Independent Variables
Variable
BLACK
SAT
DOLLARS
PRIVATE
ENROLL
TOP 25
•
TOP26-51
OTHER
GRANTS
FOOTBALL
BASKETBALL
MINORSPS
Explanation (Sources: See Appendix A)
Dummy variable for traditionally black universities
Average SAT score for incoming first year students divided
by 100
Dollar endowment in 100, 000 's
Dummy variable for a private university
Enrollment measured in 100, 000 's
Dummy variable for membership in the Top 25 schools as rated
by the U.S. News and World Report .
Dummy variable for membership in the Top 26-51 schools as
rated by the U.S. News and World Report .
Dummy variable for schools ranked in other categories by the
U.S. News and World Report (omitted category=unranked)
Number of grant-in-aid scholarships given in
Dummy variable for participation in Division lA football
Number of appearances in the NCAA men's basketball
championships 1982-1991
Number of appearances in NCAA championships in sports other
than men's basketball 1982-1991
SW Dummy variable for membership in the Southwest Conference
BIGEAST Dummy variable for membership in the Big East Conference
BIGTEN Dummy variable for membership in the Big Ten Conference
ACC Dummy variable for membership in the Atlantic Coast Conference
BIGEIGHT Dummy variable for membership in the Big 8 Conference
SEC Dummy variable for membership in the Southeastern Conference
PACIO Dummy variable for membership in the Pacific Ten Conference
IVY Dummy variable for membership in the Ivy League (omitted
category=all other conferences and independents)
Table 2: NCAA Roll-Call Votes and Factor Score Groupings
Year Vote Result Group Object
1986 14 lost SATl Eliminate using SAT score
1986 15 lost SATl Eliminate SAT for scholarship but not eligibility
1986 16 won SAT2 Require combination of SAT and grades
1992 18 won SAT2 Require SAT exam before a paid visit
1988 58 lost PELLGRANT Exempt Pell Grant from counting toward maximum aid
1988 59 won PELLGRANT Exempt Pell Grant, but place a maximum limit on total
1989 40 lost PELLGRANT Pell Grant plus financial aid can not exceed normal costs
1990 37 won PELLGRANT Increase maximum of 51400 over normal costs to $1700
1991 44 won RESTRUCT Sets minimums on percentage of Division I opponents
1991 45 won RESTRUCT Requires seven Division I sports instead of six for each gender
1991 46 won RESTRUCT Sets mimimums on the amount of financial aid for each sport
1992 16 won ELIGI Requires 2.5 GPA instead of 2.0
1992 20 won ELIGl Requires 75% of credits must be taken during the academic year
1992 21B won ELIGI Sets minimum number of credits that must be taken in major
1989 39 won ELIG2 Increases minimum number of hours that define satisfactory progress
1992 24 lost ELIG2 Increases minimum number of hours that define satisfactory progress
1992 25 won ELIG3 Remedial courses don't count toward minimum credits
1990 32A won SUMMERAID Allows summer aid if it does not come from the athletic department
1991 28 lost SUMMERAID Allows summer aid to come from the athletic department
1992 30 lost SUMMERAID Allows summer aid to come from the athletic department
1990 30B won TIMELIMIT Sets limits on amount of time devoted to football by students
1990 30C won TIMELIMIT Sets limits on amount of time devoted to basketball by students
1990 30G won TIMELIMIT Sets limits on amount of time devoted to basketball by students
1989 42 won PARTIALQl Does not allow partial qualifier to receive athletic aid (NEGATIVE)
1989 43 lost PARTIALQl Allows a fourth year of eligibility for certain partial qualifiers
1990 27 lost PARTIALQl Rescinds Proposition 42
1990 38 lost PARTIALQl Allows a fourth year of eligibility for certain partial qualifiers
1990 44 lost PARTIALQ2 Requires JC transfers who are partial qualifiers to sit one year
1992 26 lost PARTIALQ2 Requires JC transfers who are partial qualifiers to sit one year
1990 26 won PARTIALQ3 Amends Prop 42 on aid; redefines counters toward maximum H on aid
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APPENDIX A
Variable
BLACK
SAT
DOLLARS
PRIVATE
ENROLL
TOP 25
TOP26-51
OTHER
GRANTS
FOOTBALL
Source
Directory of Traditionally Black Colleges and Universities
in the United States , September 1971.
Peterson's Annual Guides to Undergraduate Study, Guide to
Four-Year Colleges (1991) . ACT scores were converted to SAT
scores following a chart of SAT-ACT equivalents provided by
the University of Illinois.
Peterson's Annual Guides to Undergraduate Study, Guide to
Four-Year Colleges.
Peterson's Annual Guides to Undergraduate Study, Guide to
Four-Year Colleges
.
Peterson's Annual Guides to Undergraduate Study, Guide to
Four-Year Colleges.
U.S. News and World Report (1991)
.
U.S. News and World Report (1991) .
U.S. News and World Report (1991)
NCAA offices
.
Peterson's Annual Guides to Undergraduate Study, Guide to
Four-Year Colleges.
BASKETBALL NCTV/^ Championships
MINORSPS NCAA Championships (various years). We gathered information
on all sports in which the NCAA conducted Division I
championships for the years 1982 to 1991. For sports where
teams qualify for the NCAA championships, we simply counted
the number of years that an individual school qualified for
the NCAAs . For sports where individuals qualify for the
NCAA championships but team scores are computed, we counted
a school as "making" the championship if their team score
finished in the top 12% of the teams in the nation. (This is
approximately the percentage used by the NCAA in deciding
the number of teams to compete in non-revenue sport
championships). For example, in 1990-91, 158 teams competed
in men's swimming. To get credit for making the NCAA
tournament in that sport a team would have had to finish in
the top twenty team scores (12 percent of 158).
Conference Memberships were based on affiliations in men's basketball. i
APPENDIX B
A Simple Example
The general model in the paper depicted the NCAA, as a club and
showed the possible advantages of imposing quality constraints. Given
that the NCAA rules are self-imposed by membership votes, the median
voter rule was applied. By forcing minimum and maximum quality levels,
the club could enhance returns and increase homogeneity.
This brief appendix offers a simple functional form that verifies
the predictions of the above model. Suppose that we can write club
returns, R, as:
R = f(N) + - a.
The first term on the right hand side needs to satisfy our requirement
that marginal returns are initially increasing in N but then diminishing
returns sets in. Thus, we use the form:
f{N) = 200N + 3b(2-N)'^ - 300.
Individual utility is written as the additive form:
U = X + r.
— R — R
We let r = S(0-,0)- be written as (0/0)-.
To complete the example, we need a simple cost function. Suppose
•-
that p^ = 1 and let C{0^,A^) = 15 +
~2~^i t>e the cost function for each
school. Recall that A is the exogenously given athletic aptitude
viable. We assumed that schools can be ranked by this variable. Thus,
the best school has A = 1, the next A = 2, and so on. This cost
function was chosen to result in a zero return equilibrium at N = 3.
This odd number of members allows use of the median voter model,
focusing on school ^^ = 2 as the crucial voter. At the unconstrained
zero return outcome, we have the following equilibrium values:
R =215.1, 0^ = 10.8, 02 = 5.4, 0^ = 3.6.
At this equilibrium, net returns, V = U - C, are:
V^ = 43.7, V2 = 14.3, V3 = 4.6.
If the fourth school chose to enter, the outcome of the resulting 4-
player Cournot equilibrium would be less attractive to the three
incumbents. However, in the current case, the net returns to the 4th
school would be negative. This assures that three is the equilibrium
size of the club.
The particular parameter values were chosen to produce outcomes
such as shown in Figures 2 and 3, Specifically, note the following:
• While the 2-school Cournot equilibrium generates positive
net returns to schools one and two, these returns are less
than those earned in the 3-school equilibrium. This
reflects the club aspect, as the third participant has value
to the schools one and two.
• Net returns for the weakest school, three, are still
positive at the quality level 0^j^^, the level of 0-^ that
maximizes returns to the median voter in the resulting
Cournot equilibrium. This is as shown in Figure 2.
• As discussed, V^ is negative in the unconstrained
equilibrium, producing an equilibrium club size of three.
However, as the club imposes maximum quality restrictions,
net returns to the fourth school improve. As shown in
Figure 3, V^ actually becomes positive if the constraint is
too tight.
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